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Abstract
We apply a new equilibrium concept to find a unique
equilibrium in a game proposed in Prescott and
Visscher(1977) and studied by Dewatripont (1987) . We believe
that this equilibrium concept can be useful in other
contexts as well.

Section One- Introduction
Recently Mathias Dewatripont has shown how in
sequential games of spatial competition a player who is
indifferent between several actions can use his indifference
strategically to force desirable equilibrium outcomes
(Dewatripont (1987)). Dewatripont uses a Hotelling-type
model first proposed in Prescott and Visscher (1977) where
three firms enter a market sequentially. He characterizes
all of the subgame perfect equilibria and gives informal
arguments why the most likely outcome is the best
equilibrium for the last entering player. The point of this
paper is to propose a formal equilibrium concept which is a
refinement of subgame perfection and that delivers the
desired outcome as the unique equilibrium of the Prescott-
Visscher game.
The essence of this equilibrium concept is as follows.
Any player can attempt to assume a leadership role by
announcing that he intends to play a particular strategy.
However we allow a strategy to be a credible announcement if
and only if that strategy is part of some subgame perfect
equilibrium of the game and it is an optimal response for
the announcing player to each equilibrium outcome in the
game induced by his announcement (i.e. the game the other
players would play if they take the first player's strategy
to be fixed at his announcement) . Roughly speaking, for a
set of strategies to constitute an equilibrium we require
that two conditions be satisfied:
1) the strategies constitute a subgame perfect
equilibrium,
2) no player could attain a higher payoff through
making a credible announcement.
Condition two is a stability or blocking requirement.
It stipulates that no player can have anything to gain by
becoming a leader in a credible manner.
We believe that this equilibrium concept can be useful
in a variety of settings. Spagat (1988) provides another
example where this concept generates an essentially unique
and plausible equilibrium in a totally different setting.
We now turn to an analysis of the formal model.
Section Two- Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the Model
We adopt the notation of Dewatripont with some minor
changes and freely utilize his results.
Three firms, A, B and C locate sequentially in order on
the unit interval [0,1] which represents consumers.
Consumers buy from whichever firm is located the closest at
an exogenously fixed price. The payoff to each firm is
simply the length of the interval of consumers buying from
that firm. It is implicit in this framework that the initial
location and production is free but that relocation is
highly costly.
The strategy sets are:
1) locations a on the unit interval for A
2) functions b(a) from [0,1] to [0,1] for firm B
giving its location b as function of firm A's location,
3) functions c(a,b) from [0,l]x[0,l] to [0,1] giving
firm C's location as a function of the locations of
the first two firms.
Dewatripont characterizes all of the subgame perfect
equilibrium payoffs of the game in the following graph which
gives payoffs to firms A and B of XA and XB with 1-XA-XB
going to firm C. Note that the best situation for firm C is
H where it receives 0.45 with firm A receiving 0.25 and firm
B receiving 0.30. These payoffs can be sustained in the
following manner.
o.vis —
DevMr^vd (ill!)
1) Firm A chooses a=0.1.
2) Finn B chooses b=l even if firm A did not choose
fl=0.1.
3) Given what A and B play, C maximizes its payoff. If
locating between A and B is optimal then any location
between A and B is optimal. In such a case C applies
the following rule.
a) a=0.1 and b=l implies c=0.4.
b) b^l implies c=b.
c) a^O.l and b=l implies c=a.
This equilibrium is just one of an infinite number of
equilibria as the diagram makes clear. But Dewatripont makes
a case that point H is the most credible equilibrium
outcome, arguing that firm C would have an incentive to
announce that it intended to follow the strategy that forces
equilibrium H.
While I am sympathetic to this argument it must be
recognized that it begs two questions. First, how is it that
firm C can force equilibrium H through announcing that it
intends to play it? Second, if firm C can force equilibria
through making announcements why is it not possible for firm
A or B to force their most desired equilibria through
announcements of what strategies they intend to play? We now
give a formal answer to these questions through the use of a
new equilibrium concept which we call validated equilibrium.
Section Three-The Equilibrium Concept
Consider the normal form of an N-player game given by
strategy spaces S 1/ ...,SN and payoff functions P1 ,...,PN
giving payoffs for the players for each configuration of
strategies. Suppose a player (say player one for
simplicity) announces that he intends to play a strategy s^^
that is part of some subgame perfect equilibrium of the game
and the other players believe him. Then s-^ will create an
induced game of N-l players with strategy spaces S 2 ,.../SN
and payoff functions P2 ,...,PN such that
* *
Pn ( s 2 i • • ' i sjj)
=
^*n (
sl ' s2 /,,,/Sn) f°r n=2 / ... / N.
The game induced by s^ may have many subgame perfect
equilibria. Suppose a particular subgame perfect equilibrium
was played in the induced game and then player one were
asked if he would like to switch to another strategy in S^^
in response to this equilibrium. If the answer is no then
his announcement has some credibility. If the answer is no
for each subgame perfect equilibrium of the induced game
then there is a particular plausibility to s-^ as an
announcement and we call it a self-validating strategy .
Formally, for any game G let E(G) be the set of subgame
perfect equilibria of G. Let G(sn ) denote the game induced
. In this paper we are working with a game given in
extensive form but for the equilibrium refinement we work
with the normal form of this game. The reader should bear
this in mind as the argument shifts back and forth between
normal and extensive form arguments.
. The notion of a self-validating strategy belongs to Klaus
Nehring.
by sn for each sn€Sn and for each n. A strategy sneSn is
self-validating iff sn is part of some subgame perfect
equilibrium of G and it is a solution to
max PnCs^ 1 , . .
.
,sn , . . . ,sN ') for each
( s l /•••/Sn_^ / sn+i ' '
'
•
'
s
n' ' e^ (®C sn^
*
Note that if (s 1 ,s2 , ...,sN ) is a subgame perfect
equilibrium in the original game it is not necessarily true
*that s-^ is a self-validating strategy for player one,
because there can be other subgame perfect equilibria in the
game induced by s-^ and s-^ may not be an optimal response
to each of them.
We need a method of assigning payoffs to validated
strategies since in general a validated strategy is
associated with many induced game equilibria, each one
giving a different payoff to the player making the
announcement. In this case we set the payoff for the
validated strategy equal to the infimum over all the payoffs
from all the equilibria of the induced game. Denote this
value v(sn ) for each self-validating strategy for each
player.
A strategy profile (s^ ,s2 ,...,sN ) is a validated
equilibrium if: 1) it is a subgame perfect equilibrium and
2) there does not exist a player who possesses a validated
strategy of the game with a higher payoff than the payoff
being received by that player at (Sj , s 2 ,...,sN ).
inCondition two can be written formally as^l n with a
self-validating sn with v(sn)>Pn (s 1*,s2 ,...,sN ). The idea
is that every player can guarantee himself a minimum payoff
by threatening to become a leader and take over the game as
long as he can do so in a credible manner (i.e. by
announcing the he intends to play a self-validating
strategy) . So the equilibrium must be robust to takeover
threats
.
Section Four- Validated Equilibrium in the Model
We now prove the most important result of this paper.
Lemma one-For each e>0 there exists a self-validating
strategy for player C which yields a payoff within e of .45.
Proof-Suppose player C announces he intends to play a
slightly modified version of the strategy from section two
where he expects player A to locate at .10+6 and player B to
locate at 1.0-e and suppose the other two players believe
him. Then A and B would find themselves in a two-person game
with payoffs to particular pairs of strategies given by the
payoffs to those pairs in the original game when player C is
playing the announced strategy.
First note that player C's announcement is clearly a
self-validating strategy. This is true because the strategy
always has him optimizing and it is part of a subgame
equilibrium. Its only interesting feature concerns how
player C resolves his indifference.
We now show that this strategy has a value of . 45+e/2
for player C. We do this by showing that at any subgame
perfect induced game equilibrium a=.10+e and b(a)=1.0-e.
First note that we can assume without loss of
generality that player A locates to the left of .50. If
player A locates at . 10+e then player B's unique optimal
choice is to locate at 1.0-e. 3 This way he will collect a
payoff of .30+e/2. Given C's announcement the most he can
get otherwise is (.90-e)/3.
We now show that player A would locate at . 10 at
equilibrium. If player A chose a point to the right of 0.25
then player B could drive C just to the left of A4 by
locating to the right of 1-a. Since player A can guarantee
himself 0.25+efoby choosing 0.1+e it would not be optimal to
locate to the right of 0.25.
If player A chooses another point a^.l0+e with a<.25,
then player B can collect (l-a+e)/2 by locating at 1.0-e or
a by locating just to the left of player A. Otherwise the
most that B can get is (l-a)/3 by locating at l-(l-a)/3.
Therefore if A locates to the left of 0.25 then player B
will locate at 1.0-e. But given player C's announcement this
implies that if player A chose a£.l+e he would receive
. We assume, following Dewatripont, that one player can
locate just to the left (or just to the right) of another
player and take the whole market to the left (right) and
nothing to the right (left) . We eliminate the possibility of
a third player choosing the same location by assigning that
third player a payoff of zero.
. This is true despite the fact that strictly speaking C is
not playing this game. We are simply applying C's fixed,
announced strategy.
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exactly a which is less than the .25+6/2 he can get by
choosing . 1+e.
Since this argument holds for arbitrarily small e we
conclude that player C has self-validating strategies with
payoffs arbitrarily close to .45 which is his highest
possible equilibrium payoff.
Lemma two-Player B has a unique self-validating strategy
that yields a payoff of .25.
Proof-First note that if B's strategy is part of some
subgame perfect equilibrium in the original game then for
a<.25, b(a) must be at least as large as l-(l-a)/3. For
a>.25, B would send C just to the left of A by locating just
to the right of l-(l-a)/3.
Consider a game induced by a strategy b(a) that
satisfies the conditions in the above paragraph. Any
location 0<a<.25 and a strategy c(a) where c is an optimal
response to a and b(a) that resolves C's indifference so
that, C locates next to A if A does not locate at a and C
locates at b(a) otherwise, will be a subgame perfect
equilibrium of the game induced by b(a) . If the b(a) is
self-validating then it must be an optimal response to all
these equilibria. This proves that b(a)=l-(l-a)/3 when
a^.25.
Furthermore we have proved that the payoff to the
unique self-validating strategy b(a) is .25. To see this
. See Dewatripont (1987)
.
12
have studied. It would be very interesting to see what kind
of results it gives in other games that contain a
substantial amount of indifference. This will be a project
for the future.
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simply note that the worst induced game equilibrium for B is
when A is located at .25 and C resolves his indifference
against B. Then the payoff to B is .25.
It is shown in Dewatripont(1987) that the highest
payoff that A can force is .25. This combined with lemmas
one and two proves:
Theorem-A validated equilibrium exists in the above game and
the equilibrium payoffs must be .25 for A, .30 for B and .45
for C at any validated equilibrium.
Conclusion
This is the second serious game we have studied where
the validated equilibrium concept yields a unique,
intuitively plausible equilibrium in a game that has an
infinite number of subgame perfect equilibria. Clearly this
concept is not the final answer to the multiplicity problem
for perfect information games. First, it is not hard to
construct examples of games where validated equilibria do
not exist (see Spagat(1987) ) . But just because they often do
not exist does not render the concept useless. After all,
dominant strategy equilibria often do not exist but when
they do they are particularly persuasive. Second, even when
they do exist some people may find other equilibria that are
not validated to be more appealing for various reasons.
But we believe that the concept has intuitive appeal in
the abstract and it has performed well in the two games we
. See Spagat(1987) for another example
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